The purpose of this monograph is to recommend USG policy options based on the author"s examination of specific Venezuelan foreign and domestic policies that enable President Chavez to confront the USG with impunity. President Chavez" challenges the USG through two core strategies. Firstly, he pursues diplomatic, military and economic relations with Russia, Iran and other USG competitors to directly challenge USG power and interests in the Southern Hemisphere. Furthermore, he effectively uses a social power foreign policy in South America to encourage regional supporters and to neutralize opposition to his domestic and foreign activities. 1 In short, Chavez provides money or favorable trade arrangements to friendly governments to gain influence. To employ this form of foreign policy, Chavez depends heavily on international oil sales.
Consideration of Venezuela"s foreign policy and attending relationships provide a basis for recommending diplomatic, information, military and economic (DIME) ways and means to limit Chavez"s activities and contain his regional influence.
President Chavez and the Bolivarian Revolution -Why Pay Attention?
As noted, Chavez is antagonistic toward the United States; and his autocratic domestic policies threaten Venezuela"s fragile democracy and the unity and common purpose within the Organization of American States. His personality, physical appearance and boorish behavior conjure images of former Panamanian strongman, Manuel Noriega. Unlike Noriega, Chavez has a vision for and commitment to his socialist cause (the Bolivarian Revolution) in Venezuela. He understands and effectively operates in his internal and external environments, and he is a wily manipulator of executive power. As the dominant political personality in Venezuela,
Chavez is a formidable international opponent. While the USG is focused on solving problems in Afghanistan, Asia and the Middle East, Hugo Chavez is deliberately and methodically marginalizing America"s role and influence in the Southern Hemisphere.
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President Chavez" policies do not reflect the best interests of Venezuela and threaten the state"s economic viability. Although generally popular with the masses, he successfully sold his political agenda to the Venezuelan public through targeted propaganda and public largesse. 3 He mostly pays for his domestic programs and distorts consumer prices through control of Venezuela"s oil export revenues. As a result of his government"s fiscal extravagance, imposition of price controls, and nationalization of key industries (which discourages investment), Venezuela"s economy is in disarray
and Chavez" popularity is in decline. Prior to the September 2010 election, the PSUV held over 90 percent of the seats Russia"s policies in Venezuela are partly in response to NATO"s expansion into Eastern Europe; reflecting Russia"s perceived relations with the United States. As a matter of enduring foreign policy, Russia seeks to confront U.S. hegemony. However, the degree of confrontation is relative to the extent of good will that exists between the USG and the Russian Government. As of this writing, relations between the governments appear to be good as evidenced by the Senate"s recent ratification of the New START. This current sense of good will provides the Obama Administration an opportunity challenge Russia"s activities in Venezuela.
Russia"s agreement to build a nuclear power plant in Venezuela is the most precarious issue facing the USG and the region in general
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. While motivated economically, the Russian Government considers building a nuclear power plant in Venezuela a low-risk means to limit America"s policy options towards Venezuela and its neighbors. If completed, Russian leaders realize that the USG is not likely to use military power against a nuclear-capable Venezuela. Additionally, nuclear capability in Venezuela potentially creates regional problems as other South American countries react to a perceived shift in the balance of power. The USG may be obliged to forcefully oppose Venezuela"s endeavor. The subject of nuclear proliferation is addressed latter in the monograph.
Less directly perilous to the United States, but foreboding to Venezuela"s neighbors and the region is Russian resourcing of the state"s significant military build-up. In September 2009, Russia signed an agreement to provide Venezuela a $2.2 billion loan to purchase 92 tanks and S-300 anti-aircraft missiles. 15 Also, Russia intends to build an assault rifle factory in Venezuela. 16 This, in addition to 24 fighter aircraft and over 100,000 AK-47 assault rifles already purchased, threatens to destabilize Central and South America. In view of Chavez" alleged support to FARC, Venezuela"s expanding military capabilities directly threaten the Columbian Government.
To be sure, convincing the Russian Government to do something it does not want to do will be difficult for the USG. As discussed, Russia is skeptical of USG intentions, is economically motivated, and is in a strong position to challenge USG interests.
Concomitantly, the Obama Administration is committed to "Re-set" relations with Russia on a more positive, bi-lateral footing; as evidenced by the administration"s decision to drop a plan to base a missile defense system in Eastern Europe and by signing the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in April 2010. 17 In light of these sentiments and events, neither country wants to jeopardize relations; but neither feels compelled to give in to the other in regards to policies in Eastern Europe or Venezuela.
It is essential to define the compromises the USG anticipates from Russia, and how those concessions could affect Russia"s enduring interests. In short, the USG wants Russia to abjure introduction of capabilities in Venezuela that destabilize the Western
Hemisphere. Specifically, the USG wants Russia to refrain from building a nuclear power plant in Venezuela; and to sell Venezuela military hardware and production capabilities that meet Venezuela"s self-defense needs. Abiding these compromises, Russia stands to lose monetarily. More significantly, concessions to the USG risk Russia"s perceived international power relative to the United States. Equally important, Russia stands to diminish its international credibility as a reliable diplomatic, economic and military partner. The USG is able to compensate Russia economically through favorable trade agreements or financial aid; but the other two issues present the greater diplomatic challenge.
Resolving the prestige and credibility concerns obliges the USG to readdress
Eastern European issues important to Russia to obtain Russian concessions in
Venezuela and the South American region. For starters, to assuage Russia"s perception of being treated as a second-rate power, the USG is best served to deal with the Russian Government on a basis of state equality; and not dwell on Russia"s slide to autocracy during negotiations.
As a topic of national interest, Russia maintains that the former Soviet states remain within Russia"s sphere of influence; a claim that President Obama publicly rejected in July 2009. 18 The first negotiation challenge, in view of the opposing positions on this matter, is to establish common ground to provide a starting point for negotiations.
Russia is concerned with encroachment on its western boarder; whereas the USG does not want destabilizing, external influences in South America. These respective interests provide that common ground.
As a major departure from current policy, the USG could acknowledge Russia"s proximal interests in the Ukraine and Georgia. In exchange, calling on the Russian Iran"s successful pursuit of nuclear weapons capability could be a watershed event for global non-proliferation with direct implications on Venezuela. As evidenced by Pakistan, North Korea and Iran, the United Nation"s Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is failing and is effectively unenforceable. In its 2008 report on global expansion of civil nuclear power, the International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) highlights the relative ease for states to exploit "loopholes" in NPT guidelines to develop nuclear capability.
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Without the discipline of the state suppliers of nuclear technology (like Russia) to control proliferation, the USG is in a conundrum. In short, the USG can continue to enforce non-proliferation through United Nations organizations and protocols; or it can follow more direct actions against violating states.
In one example, the Israeli Government considers a nuclear-armed Iran to be an "existential threat" and it conveys its willingness to prevent that occurrence. 23 As discussed, the USG does not want Russia to build a nuclear power plant in Venezuela;
and it is feasible (albeit difficult) that the USG can negotiate a commitment from the Russian Government to renege on its agreement. Among its recommendations, the ISAB advises the USG to "focus its non-proliferation efforts for the near term on uniting the nuclear suppliers, rather than taking on the full panoply of international states." 24 In the event Venezuela actively pursues and is close to obtaining nuclear capability (particularly if Chavez or a chosen successor remains in power), the United States may, similar to Israel"s position towards Iran, consider the security risk sufficient to deliberately reduce Venezuela"s capability.
The Organization of American States -Why South America Acquiesces?
In view of President Chavez"s domestic policies, Venezuela"s expanding military and the country"s often bellicose relations with neighboring states; it begs the question why other South American states tend to avoid confrontation with the Venezuelan Government. As a best case situation, the USG could exploit regional concerns about Venezuela"s destabilizing policies through the OAS and obtain mutually acceptable strategies to limit the Venezuela"s most adverse domestic and foreign activities.
Historical relations between South American states run deep, and the complexity of state relations preclude the likelihood of this type of agreement. Despite his often boorish demeanor and personal friction with other South American leaders, Hugo
Chavez is generally successful in managing regional, foreign policy matters.
Significantly, he has successfully isolated unfriendly neighboring states and prevented OAS cooperation to oppose Venezuela"s most egregious policies. He also marginalized the USG"s ability to do likewise. The most appealing aspect of Venezuela"s patronage is that it is unaccountable and is provided unconditionally. To maximize the moral effects of this policy, Chavez" "goes out of his way to flaunt his largesse" 28 through the use of public media. Social power foreign policy is an effective, non-threatening method Chavez uses to challenge the United States" influence in the region; and at present the USG has no plan to counter his largesse by offering equal or greater economic support.
Direct Policy Options Towards Venezuela
Under the Obama Administration, foreign policy is tailored to individual, South
American states instead of a broader, regional approach 29 . USG interests in Venezuela center on maintaining stability in the Americas. In short, the USG seeks to foster a relationship with Venezuela that is receptive to collective prosperity and to the advancement of democratic values and institutions. However, America"s democratic ideals and traditions markedly differ from Venezuela"s checkered democratic past. The USG has limited, direct strategy options to influence the Chavez Government.
Diplomatically, Hugo Chavez is unreceptive to improving relations. He recently rejected the USG"s appointment of Larry Palmer to be the U.S. ambassador to Venezuela, resulting in the USG expelling Venezuela"s ambassador to the United States. Although
Chavez is careful to avoid complete severance of diplomatic ties, he actively pursues alternative alliances to marginalize U.S. influence in the region and to reduce Venezuela"s dependency on the United States. Through his anti-American rhetoric, President Chavez has effectively painted himself into a corner, and he stands to lose credibility among his domestic and foreign allies if he changes his attitude towards the U.S. He needs the image of Yankee hegemony to detract from Venezuela"s economic and social problems, and to justify his increasingly autocratic politics.
The use of military force to remove Hugo Chavez from office and dismantle the PSUV is a feasible, but unacceptable and unsuitable strategy for the USG. Absent a proximate cause or compelling, immediate threat to USG interests, a war of choice stands to erode the United State"s credibility and long-term influence in South America.
As a counter to Venezuela"s growing military capability, the USG retains close ties with
Columbia. The USG and Columbian Government recently negotiated an agreement authorizing US military basing in Columbia to facilitate anti-drug trafficking operations. If the USG has any direct leverage over Venezuela, it falls within the economic and information instruments of power. Economic influence is double-edged and is tied primarily to oil. Arguably, the United States, with its propensity to consume oil and maintain a disproportionately high living standard, is its own worst enemy. For its part, Venezuela depends on oil exports to the United States, which accounted for 18.4% of Venezuela"s GDP in 2009. 33 As previously addressed, President Chavez seeks to reduce Venezuela"s economic dependence on the United States, but the United States and China are the only countries able to efficiently process Venezuela"s highly sulfuric crude oil. Not surprisingly, the United States is vulnerable as it gets approximately 10% of its oil imports from Venezuela, and has no ready, alternative source to replace that quantity. 34 If an alternative source could be found, or if the United States managed to significantly reduce oil consumption, USG-imposed oil sanctions offer a powerful tool to limit President Chavez"s activities and diminish his power.
In Ironically, Chavez" own bellicosity provides the USG a pretext to impose sanctions;
provided the USG set conditions to seize on the next opportunity. Chavez has threatened to cut off oil exports several times; most recently last July in response to USG support to Columbia over Venezuela"s ongoing dispute with that country. As a condition, the USG is obliged to arrange alternative sources through increased domestic production or foreign contracts.
The USG imposition of other economic sanctions on Venezuela is problematic for American state will actively seek to remove Chavez from power, it is feasible that these states -particularly Brazil and Argentina -will continue to view Venezuela as an unfriendly agitator and a competitor, and limit policies favorable to his government.
Conclusion
In conclusion, President Hugo Chavez and his political apparatus are a problem for the USG and a threat to stability in the Southern Hemisphere. While his anti-American rhetoric and autocratic domestic policies adversely affect U.S. regional influence, Chavez" pursuit of nuclear power, his expanded military capabilities, and his willingness to support revolution in neighboring states directly threaten long-term stability.
The best outcome that the USG can promote is that the Venezuelan people vote
Chavez out of office and replace his government with one more receptive to American ideals and interests. In view of Chavez" manipulation of Venezuela"s political process and his actions to solidify his power position, the USG is obligated to pursue foreign policy strategies to isolate Chavez internationally and limit his influence in the region.
Absent a strong hand to deal directly with President Chavez, the USG is able to provide incentives for other foreign actors, most significantly Russia, to promote this desired end state.
In this essay, I analyzed USG foreign policy and strategies towards Venezuela; and subsequently concluded that the USG has limited options. Chavez" relationship with Iran is of lesser immediate concern to the USG. Although
Iran"s nuclear program and willingness to cooperate with Venezuela presents a threat to U.S. interests, Venezuela is not presently able to take advantage of Iran"s nuclear expertise. Additionally, the existing relationship of two such different countries is dependent on the relationship of the individual state leaders.
Among the South American states, the USG should not expect the OAS or the more powerful, individual states (Brazil, Argentina) to directly challenge Hugo Chavez.
Despite his adverse domestic and foreign policies, President Chavez" effective use of social power foreign policy in the region will continue to divide potential opposition.
With regards to direct application of the instruments of national power, the USG is capable of imposing economic sanctions on oil imports and other U.S. exports to Venezuela to limit Chavez" regional influence and expedite in his ouster from power. Of consequence, an oil supply disruption directly threatens the U.S. economy; and other state actors stand ready to replace U.S. firms in Venezuela"s import markets. Based on analysis of the United States" economic and political strength, the USG is able to withstand the adverse affects.
In the end, Hugo Chavez and the Bolivarian Revolution will follow the same path to demise as did previous Venezuelan autocracies. For the USG, the sooner this event comes about, the better. To be sure, the USG does not need other South American state to embrace his form of adventurism and anti-Americanism.
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